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### SIGNIFICANT ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED INITIALLY BY THE INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE

Per RADM Bergins request at the DRPWG Meeting on 24 Sep 76 the following condensed list of Key Issues is furnished. It has been prepared in order to give some sense of priorities in the three major study areas indicated, with a view toward the early utility to the task forces of this information from the Intelligence community, and with the realization that other important items will emerge as the study progresses. This list is not, however, intended to delete issues from lists previously circulated.

#### A. The International Situation

- Significant changes in the world since the late 1960's and their impact on US national security.
- Changes in the threat due to technological developments and proliferation.
- Identify trends in Soviet policy toward US and our Allies and Key countries of the Third World.
- Specific region/country developments
  - Increasing political importance and instability on the NATO flanks (both North and South).
  - Developments among Third World suppliers of critical raw materials.
  - Competition between LDCs for critical materials and potential instability resulting therefrom.
  - Developments relative to the Caribbean Basin; Spain; Japan; black Africa.
- Implications of continued large-scale FMS in the Middle East.

#### B. Strategic Nuclear Forces

- Identify Soviet objectives in key arms control issues, re. SALT, etc.
- Status of Soviet nuclear capabilities and projected development.
- Soviet assessment of equivalence required to achieve strategic balance vs that which is required for strategic superiority. *probably weak*
- Identify Soviet interests in acquiring a war-winning capability.
- Implications of Soviet civil defense measures.

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- Soviet R&D priorities to include strategic defense.

### C. General Purpose Forces

- Developments in the threat due to changes in Soviet capabilities in NATO; time available for mobilization; WP sustaining capability.
- More probable conflicts outside of NATO which may affect US interests; warning times; intensity; duration.
- Soviet capability for power projection.
- Soviet propensity to involve military forces directly or through client states beyond USSR periphery; location.
- Number of simultaneous conflicts in different theaters.
- PRC capability and propensity to become directly involved in conflicts on or beyond the PRC periphery.
- Effect of all of the above on regional political-military stability.
- The Soviet view of the relationships between theater nuclear forces and strategic forces; between theater-nuclear forces and conventional forces.

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